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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines how the general framework for indispensability
arguments developed by Enoch in the metaethical context plays out in its
ancestral home, the philosophy of mathematics. Enoch’s framework is inspired
by the Quine–Putnam type of indispensability argument in mathematics and is
liable to inherit the latter’s holism. But once this holism is expunged from
Enoch’s framework it turns out that Enoch’s indispensability argument is
stronger in the moral than in the mathematical case, since it is more plausible
that normative entities are indispensible to all projects of practical deliberation
than it is that mathematical entities are indispensible to all projects of scientific
theorizing. The upshot is that, given Enoch’s framework, the move away from
holism undermines indispensability arguments in mathematics but not in ethics
Keywords: deliberation, Enoch, indispensability, holism, mathematical objects, normative properties

12.1 Indispensability Theses
Indispensability arguments are widespread both inside and outside philosophy.
Imagine that I make a New Year’s resolution to learn how to cook French
cuisine. Hearing of this project, you warn me that
(1) Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking
and that this is a problem because the local grocery stores do not stock shallots.
Presuming that this indispensability claim is true, what are my options for
pressing ahead with my cooking project in the absence of shallots? The first
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option is for me to simply lower my standards: fine French cooking may require
shallots, but I will just set my sights on adequate French cooking, which should
still be possible, perhaps by just substituting onions where shallots are called
for. A second option is to stick with the fine cooking project, but to switch
cuisines. Perhaps I will learn instead how to cook fine Thai food, which is shallotfree, and make use of the well-stocked Asian grocery store in my neighborhood.
A third option is to keep my focus on fine French cuisine, but abandon my
aspirations to cook it. Instead I will read about its history, browse classic
cookbooks, and go out to upmarket French restaurants to sample canonical
dishes.
All three of these options would permit me to retain important aspects of my
original project, while not purchasing a single shallot. And I can do this without
challenging the ‘shallot indispensability thesis’ enshrined in (1). But what if I
want to stick to the letter of my original intention, namely to cook fine French
food? Do the following three propositions form a consistent set?
(p.221) (1) Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking.
(2) I carry out the project of learning to cook fine French food.
(3) I do not use any shallots.
I think that this set is indeed consistent, and that—despite the frivolity of this
particular example—that there is a more general point here that has important
implications for indispensability arguments in different areas of philosophy.
The two areas that I shall focus on here are philosophy of mathematics and
metaethics. In recent years, several philosophers have sought to draw parallels
between the use of indispensability arguments in these two areas. Although I
think that there are useful insights to be gained through such a comparative
study, my main goal in this chapter is to sound a note of caution. Differences
between the contexts of applied mathematics and of metaethics mean that when
we formulate sets of propositions corresponding to (1), (2), and (3) for each of
these domains, the set is consistent in the mathematical case but not in the
ethical case. This gives the opponents of indispensability an avenue of escape in
the former that is not available in the latter, which in turn affects how the
corresponding indispensability argument needs to be formulated. To put the
point in terms that are not yet very helpful: applied mathematics is more like
French cooking than metaethics!
An influential argument for mathematical Platonism is based on the following
indispensability thesis:
(4) Mathematics is indispensable for science.
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Put very briefly, the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument (QPIA) ties our
ontological commitments to those of our best available scientific theories. We
ought rationally to believe in theoretical posits such as electrons and black holes
because they are indispensable to current science. Abstract mathematical
objects such as numbers, functions, and sets are also indispensable to current
science. Hence we ought to believe in the existence of abstract mathematical
objects, and we ought to embrace mathematical Platonism.
(1) and (4) are similar in form: in both cases, indispensability is a two-place
relation, ‘X is indispensable for Y’. But there are apparent differences in what
kind of relatum fills these X and Y slots in the respective relations. In our
cookery example, what is claimed to be indispensable is a kind of object (i.e.
shallots). In the Platonism example, what is claimed to be indispensable is a
subject matter (i.e. mathematics). Actually, I think (1) and (4) can be
paraphrased, without loss of meaning, so as to bring their respective X-relata
more into line. The difference is that, in discussions of French cooking, no side
in the debate doubts the (p.222) existence of shallots. Hence, involving shallots
directly as a relatum in the indispensability claim in (1) does not beg any
questions. By contrast, the relevant debate within the philosophy of mathematics
is precisely about whether abstract mathematical objects exist. So antiPlatonists will not (initially) accept any claim about the indispensability of
mathematical objects per se. (4) is standardly read as elliptical for
(4’) Quantification over mathematical objects is indispensable for science.
Thus, what is asserted to be indispensable for science is the activity of
quantifying over mathematical objects, rather than the mathematical objects
themselves. Correspondingly, (1) could also be paraphrased to put an activity as
the X-relatum:
(1’) Using shallots is indispensable for fine French cooking.
So much for the first half of the indispensability relation.1 What about the
second half? In his recent book Taking Morality Seriously, David Enoch draws
inspiration from QPIA to formulate an indispensability argument for what he
calls ‘robust metanormative realism’. Central to Enoch’s discussion is the
distinction he draws between ‘instrumental indispensability’ and ‘intrinsic
indispensability’. Instrumental indispensability corresponds to the two-place
relation we have been discussing above. As Enoch puts it, ‘indispensability is
always indispensability for or to a certain purpose or project’ (2011 p. 67, italics
in original).
What makes Enoch’s approach so interesting is the generality of the framework
that he constructs for analyzing indispensability arguments across a range of
different contexts. My plan is to look at some key features of Enoch’s framework
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and see what insights might be applied back to more specific indispensability
arguments, both in mathematics and in metaethics.

12.2 Projects
Despite the importance to Enoch’s analysis of the notion of a project, nowhere
does he give an explicit definition of what he means by this term. He does,
however, give several examples of candidate projects. His two core examples are
the scientific project and the deliberative project. Enoch does not say much
about the scientific project, other than that he sees it as filling the Y-relatum in
the indispensability thesis of QPIA. He goes into considerably more detail about
the (p.223) deliberative project, since this lies at the core of his own version of
the indispensability argument. Deliberation, for Enoch, is ‘the process of trying
to make the decision it makes the most sense for one to make’ (2011 p. 73). In
deliberating, ‘you commit to there being (normative) reasons relevant to your
deliberation’ (p. 74). The deliberative project, then, is the general practice of
‘asking ourselves what to do, what to believe, how to reason, what to care
about’ (p. 70). In addition to these two examples, Enoch also mentions in passing
the following projects: ‘the reasoning project’ (p. 64); ‘the project of finding out
about [the external world]’ (p. 64); ‘the project of sorcery’ (p. 69); ‘the project of
achieving eternal bliss’ (p. 69).
These examples of projects are strikingly diverse, but one feature they have in
common is their extreme generality. As we shall see, this generality plays an
important role in the next stage of Enoch’s argument. As Enoch points out,
instrumental indispensability per se cannot be enough to ground ontological
commitment: some restriction is needed on what counts as an ‘acceptable’
project. What places the scientific project on the right side of this divide, and the
project of sorcery on the wrong side? Enoch has an interesting answer to this
question. He introduces a second notion, intrinsic indispensability, and defines a
project to be intrinsically indispensable if it is ‘rationally non-optional’. This
results in the following proposed criterion of ontological commitment:
(IP) We ought rationally to be ontologically committed to F’s if F’s are
instrumentally indispensable for an intrinsically indispensable project.
Thus, we ought to believe in the existence of electrons, and numbers, because
they are instrumentally indispensable to the intrinsically indispensable scientific
project. And, according to Enoch, we ought to believe in irreducibly normative
truths because they are instrumentally indispensable to the intrinsically
indispensable deliberative project. As Enoch puts it, ‘the respectability of the
project confers respectability on [the] commitment’ (2011 p. 69). Among the
projects that Enoch mentions, all very general in their scope and scale, some are
rationally non-optional and others are not. The project of sorcery, for example, is
presumably one that we can (and probably should) opt out of. Hence it does not
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matter to our ontological commitments what is (instrumentally) indispensable
for sorcery.
(IP) has an appealing symmetry, in its combining two notions of indispensability
into a single criterion of ontological commitment. And the idea of using rational
non-optionality as the marker of ontologically serious projects is an interesting
one. So let us assume, for sake of argument, that (IP) is correct as a criterion for
ontological commitment. In making this assumption, I am (p.224) deliberately
bypassing at least two significant debates within the indispensability literature.
Firstly, many anti-realists take issue with instrumental indispensability being
sufficient, even in the context of an intrinsically indispensable project. So-called
‘weasel nominalists’ in the philosophy of mathematics take this line against
QPIA, arguing that there is nothing irrational about making certain claims in the
course of pursuing a project and then taking back these claims at the end.
Secondly, some anti-realists have questioned the legitimacy of linking intrinsic
indispensability to truth. Just because I cannot rationally avoid engaging in a
project, why think that the results of the project are likely to be true? There is
plenty more to be said on both sides of these two debates, but they will not be
my concern here.
The question I want to address in the remainder of the chapter is whether
Enoch’s framework can be applied to more recent indispensability-centered
debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and in particular whether his notion
of a ‘non-optional project’ can get traction in these debates. One irony of
Enoch’s drawing on indispensability debates in the philosophy of mathematics to
motivate his favored version of metanormative realism is that in many respects
these debates have moved on in ways that have a significant impact on Enoch’s
analytical framework. One major change, as we shall see, is that the focus has
shifted—in these philosophy of mathematics debates—to projects that look very
different from the large-scale projects that Enoch presents.

12.3 Abandoning Holism about Projects
What does it mean for a particular activity to be indispensable ‘for science’? As
Enoch points out, little attention was paid to this question in the early debates
over QPIA, mainly because this argument is firmly rooted in Quine’s holism. On
this picture, science is a web of interconnected theories evaluated as a single
whole by balancing such criteria as empirical adequacy and simplicity. If the best
such web contains mathematical posits, then mathematics is indispensable for
science. It matters not where in the web such posits appear, nor what precise
theoretical role they play.
Over the past decade or so, however, defenders of Platonism have sought to
separate the indispensability argument from Quinean holism. Once holism is
abandoned, specification of the Y-relatum of the indispensability thesis becomes
crucial—vague reference to indispensability ‘for science’ is no longer enough,
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since it may not necessarily be the case that all parts and aspects of the
scientific project are ontologically on a par. There are at least two basic axes
along which such specification might take place. Firstly, we might subdivide the
scientific (p.225) project into different kinds of activity (or theoretical role),
such as description, prediction, explanation, or theory formulation. Secondly, we
might subdivide by subject area, for example chemistry, physics, evolutionary
biology, or quantum mechanics.2
Holism-free versions of QPIA have tended to focus on specification of theoretical
role. The most popular of these ‘second-generation’ indispensability arguments
focuses on explanatory role. The motivating idea is that the target audience for
QPIA is scientific realists, and that the core generator of ontological
commitment within scientific realism is inference to the best explanation. We
believe in the existence of electrons not merely because we cannot avoid
quantifying over them, but because the existence of electrons best explains
various observations that we make. What matters, therefore, is whether
mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science. Thus the
sharpened indispensability thesis is:
(5) Mathematics plays an indispensable explanatory role in science.
The resulting argument is known variously as the Explanatory Indispensability
Argument or the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA).
This move towards focusing more explicitly on explanation, as embodied in EIA,
may not seem much different in spirit from Enoch’s own explication of QPIA.
According to Enoch’s analysis, although QPIA is focused on the scientific project
as a whole, the principal evaluative criterion used when comparing competing
theories is explanatory. F’s are indispensable for the scientific project if the most
explanatory overall theory includes F’s. However, this common focus on
explanation masks an important difference between EIA and Enoch’s conception
of QPIA. This is because Enoch retains the fundamental holism that is present in
the Quinean framework; competing formulations of a single overarching
scientific theory are still compared as wholes. All that has changed is that the
theoretical virtue of explanatoriness has been promoted to the top spot when
comparing these theories.
EIA is sharply different in this respect, since—as has already been mentioned—it
is predicated on a rejection of Quinean holism. No longer are scientific theories
(or webs of scientific theories) compared in their entirety. Instead, the focus is
on individual explanations in science. The point is that what matters is the
explanatory role of the posits, not the overall explanatoriness (p.226) of the
theory in which they happen to be embedded. The proponent of EIA concedes
the point—pressed by Maddy, Melia, and others—that mere appearance in an
explanatory theory is not enough to ground ontological commitment to a given
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posit. Our best overall theory of fluid mechanics may make reference to such
things as continuous fluids and infinitely deep reservoirs, but that ought not to
commit us to the existence of idealized entities of this sort.
Couched in Enoch’s terminology, what has happened in the evolution from QPIA
to EIA is a shift from viewing the instrumental indispensability of mathematics
as pertaining to the scientific project as a whole, or even just to the explanatory
subproject within science, and instead viewing this instrumental indispensability
as pertaining to a collection of ‘mini-projects’ that concern the explanation of
specific scientific phenomena. This shift is crucial because of the following fact
about scientific explanation: many (perhaps most) scientific explanations do not
make explanatory use of mathematics. For many of these mini-projects,
therefore, mathematics is not instrumentally indispensable. For those
explanatory mini-projects that do make indispensable use of mathematics, we
need to revisit the question of whether they are indeed rationally non-optional in
Enoch’s sense.

12.4 Explanatory Mini-Projects—Optional and Non-Optional
For present purposes, I shall take an explanatory mini-project to be an
investigation that seeks to answer a request to explain some specific scientific
phenomenon or pattern of phenomena. Such investigations may have both
theoretical and experimental components, and may vary considerably in their
scope and sophistication. To give us something to focus on, let us consider two
such potential mini-projects:
(6) Why do periodical cicadas have prime periods?
(7) Why does C. Elegans have a prime number of cells?
Mini-project (6) is quite well-known, and has been much discussed in the recent
literature on EIA.3 Mini-project (7) has never (to my knowledge) been either
articulated or pursued.
So how does the issue of rational non-optionality play out in the context of EIA?
It is tempting to think that the rational non-optionality of the scientific (p.227)
project is enough to ground EIA also, since all the explanatory mini-projects are
components of the scientific project. But this is not enough. For we might be
able to engage in the (non-optional) scientific project to a sufficient degree
without engaging in those explanatory mini-projects that indispensably involve
mathematics. Returning to my initial French cooking scenario, we can now see
more clearly how the three core claims, listed below, could be jointly consistent:
(1) Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking.
(2) I carry out the project of learning to cook fine French food.
(3) I do not use any shallots.
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Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking, but many individual French
dishes do not call for shallots. So it is in fact possible to pursue the project of
learning to cook fine French food, at least to a considerable degree, without
acquiring any shallots. I can do this by picking those mini-projects, within the
overall project of French cuisine, that do not involve shallots.
In this respect, there is a crucial disanalogy between the scientific project and
the deliberative project. Amongst the mini-projects that make up the scientific
project, some involve mathematics and some do not. By contrast, all—or nearly
all—of the mini-projects that make up the deliberative project involve reference
to metanormative truths. This is because, for Enoch, a deliberative mini-project
is precisely the search for, and evaluation of, normative reasons that are relevant
to the given decision. (If no reasons are forthcoming one way or the other, Enoch
refers to the process not as ‘deliberation’ but as ‘arbitrary picking’ (2011 p. 73).)
In other words, reasons are built into every specific case of deliberation,
whereas mathematics is not built into every specific case of scientific
explanation. As a result, it is plausible—in the metanormative context—to give a
strong reading to the claim of instrumental indispensability: all (or nearly all)
mini-projects within the deliberative project make essential reference to
metanormative truths. Hence we cannot pursue the deliberative project at all
without engaging with such truths. And this is the case regardless of whether
any given mini-project is intrinsically indispensable.
As I have argued, the situation with respect to scientific explanation (and French
cooking!) is sharply different. Since within science there are many explanatory
mini-projects that avoid commitment to mathematical objects, the issue of the
intrinsic indispensability of these mini-projects now comes to the fore. Put
simply, unless at least some of those explanatory mini-projects that involve
mathematics are themselves intrinsically indispensable, the road to ontological
commitment to mathematical objects is blocked. (Analogously, what is required
to force a commitment to acquire shallots is not just the (p.228) demonstration
that some French recipes need shallots, but that those dishes are themselves an
unavoidably central part of French cuisine.)
Why is this a problem for the defender of EIA who wants to use Enoch’s
framework? The problem is that specific mini-projects do seem to be rationally
optional, and hence not intrinsically indispensable.4 Firstly, it seems
psychologically possible to resist pursuing a specific explanatory project, even if
we cannot stop ourselves across the board from seeking explanations of worldly
phenomena. If someone poses the question of why cicadas have prime periods,
there seems nothing to stop us from simply refusing to take up this challenge.5
Secondly, this point seems to generalize across mini-projects regardless of
context. As Enoch himself notes, ‘We can, of course, stop deliberating about one
thing or another…It’s opting out of the deliberative project as a whole that may
not be an option for us.’ (2011 pp. 70–1).6 If, as seems to be the case, rational
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non-optionality of this psychological sort does not work to underpin a notion of
intrinsic indispensability once we move from projects to mini-projects, is there
some other sense of non-optionality that can do this job? One idea is to draw on
methodological considerations from the scientific project itself. In other words,
might there be rational grounds, given the general pursuit of the scientific
project, that compel engagement with certain mini-projects?
Let us schematize the notion of explanatory mini-project that was introduced at
the beginning of Section 12.4, and view it as stemming from a request to explain
why some type of physical phenomenon, P, has property, Q. Rather than asking
when we ought rationally to pursue a mini-project of this sort, it makes more
sense to ask instead about criteria for when it is rationally acceptable not to
pursue it. Below is a list of some putative such criteria:
(a) Truth: There are scientific grounds for doubting the truth of the
explanandum, i.e. that P does in fact have property Q.7
(b) Relevance: P and/or Q are not part of the subject matter of science.8
(p.229) (c) Significance: The fact that P has property Q is not
scientifically significant.9
(d) Feasibility: The mini-project to explain why P has property Q has little
chance of success.10
Note that (c) and (d) have more to do with practical rationality than theoretical
rationality. In other words, if the explanandum is both scientific in its subject
matter and such that we are justified, on scientific grounds, in believing it, then
the only grounds for not engaging in the mini-project are pragmatic.

12.5 Picking Out Physical Patterns
Things get more complicated, however, if we shift our attention to one particular
form of explanandum that is exhibited by many putative mathematical
explanations in science. Both of the explanatory mini-projects listed in Section
12.4 have the following form:
(MP) Why does physical phenomenon, P, have mathematical property, M?
For example, mini-project (7) asks why C. Elegans has a prime number of cells. A
natural way of paraphrasing this claim is that the cells of C. Elegans can be
mapped one–one onto a set whose cardinality is a prime number. However, here
the explanandum is itself specified using objects from the contested (i.e.
mathematical) domain. This appears to open the way to a third way of avoiding
engagement with a given mini-project, on theoretical rational grounds, namely
that the explanandum is only true if the existence of objects from the contested
domain is already assumed. The point is that it looks question-begging to try to
give an argument for the existence of F’s based on the indispensability of F’s for
a mini-project which is itself premised on the existence of F’s!
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The problem, for the defender of mathematical Platonism, is that many—perhaps
most—putative examples of mathematical explanation in science pertain to
explananda that have the form given by (MP) above. Is there a way to argue,
non-question-beggingly, for the rational non-optionality of such mini-projects?
My view is that the Platonist does have an answer to the above challenge. I shall
begin by sketching the general contours of the Platonist strategy and then show
how it plays out in some specific cases.
(p.230) The first step is the use of a mathematical property, M, to pick out a
feature of some token physical phenomenon, P, or to pick out a pattern that
holds across a range of physical phenomena of a given type. The key point is that
this purely descriptive use of M is not taken to be ontologically committing by
either side in the EIA debate, even if it is indispensable. Therefore, it does not
beg the question against the anti-Platonist side to take this claim, that P has
property M, as a provisional explanandum. We only get ontological commitment
if the pattern picked out by M has explanatory power, and this depends on what
the best explanation of (MP) turns out to be. I will not try here to give a precise
characterization of explanatory power, but I take it to be closely linked to the
capacity to generalize across a range of different situations. If the property or
pattern picked out by M can in turn explain various more specific properties and
patterns, then this boosts its explanatory credentials. Conversely, if nothing of
much significance follows from possessing M then the mathematical property is
not explanatory.
I shall formalize the above line of reasoning by introducing the notion of a
mathematical property being ‘salient’:
Definition: M is salient with respect to P if there is no other mathematical
property, M*, such that M* is part of the best explanation of why M applies
to P, but M is not part of the best explanation of why M* applies to P.
The meta-property of salience is intended to pick out those mathematical
properties that are explanatorily significant. It also provides a criterion of
intrinsic indispensability: an explanatory mini-project of the form (MP) is
intrinsically indispensable if and only if M is salient with respect to P.
To see how this plays out in an actual example, let us return to mini-project (6),
which aims to explain why periodical cicadas have prime periods. As discussed
in a previous paper, the best explanation of this fact is the following (cf. Baker
2005 p. 233):
(6a) Having a life-cycle period which minimizes intersection with other
(nearby/lower) periods is evolutionarily advantageous. [Biological ‘law’]
(6b) Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime periods).
[Number theoretic theorem]
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(6c) Hence organisms with periodic life-cycles are likely to evolve periods
that are prime.
My claim is that primeness here is a salient mathematical property. On the one
hand, there seems to be no other mathematical property whose holding explains
(p.231) why primeness holds. On the other hand, the above explanation can be
extended to explain why other more specific mathematical properties hold. For
example, we can use it—together with some specific ecological facts—to explain
why a given cicada subspecies has a seventeen-year period:
(6d) Cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are limited by biological constraints to
periods from fourteen to eighteen years.
(6e) Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are likely to evolve seventeenyear periods.
A significant feature of this specific explanandum, (6e), is that its mathematical
component is dispensable. Reference to the period having a length of seventeen
years can be paraphrased, in familiar fashion, into the language of first-order
logic with identity. Thus the explanatory credentials of the salient mathematical
property of primeness include the capacity to explain non-mathematical
explananda.
It is important to note that salience is not an intrinsic feature of a given
mathematical property. Just because primeness is salient in the context of miniproject (6) does not mean that it is salient in other contexts to which it applies.
Consider, for example, mini-project (7), which is to explain why the nematode
worm, C. Elegans, has a prime number of cells.11 Experimental evidence tells us
that C. Elegans has 1031 cells, and nothing in current biological theory gives us
reason to think that there is any particular significance to the fact that this
number is prime. Perhaps there is some explanation for why C. Elegans has 1031
cells, based on its evolutionary and developmental history. In this case, the best
explanation for the explanandum of mini-project (7) has the following form:
(7a) […Evolutionary/developmental explanation…]
(7b) Hence, C. Elegans has 1031 cells.
(7c) 1031 is a prime number.
(7d) Hence, C. Elegans has a prime number of cells.
My claim, therefore, is that—in the context of mini-project (7)—primeness is not
a salient property. It is explanatorily superfluous.
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Another way of looking at the contrast between (6) and (7) is in terms of the
direction of explanation. The explanation given in (6) shows us that the cicada
subspecies has period seveneteen (in part) because its period is prime.
Conversely, the explanation in (7) shows us that C. Elegans has a prime number
of cells because it has 1031 cells. In (6), there is a ‘top-down’ explanation using
(p.232) primeness; in (7) there is a ‘bottom-up’ explanation of primeness.
Hence primeness is salient in the former context but not in the latter.
Another aspect of explanatory power that is not an explicit byproduct of salience
is the capacity for a given pattern of explanation to apply to other, distinct
contexts. The pattern of explanation in the cicada mini-project is quite general,
but does this mathematical framework actual apply to other cases? One obvious
place to look is for other kinds of periodical organism, however it is unclear from
the biological literature whether there are any cases of organisms with fixed,
multi-year lifecycles other than periodical cicadas. In the absence of a clear case
from evolutionary biology, I offer here a mini-project from a quite different
subdomain of the scientific project. Despite its very different setting, it shares
the mathematical framework of the cicada mini-project and with it the salient
property of primeness.
(8) Why do the rear cogs of brakeless, fixed-gear bicycles typically have a
prime number of teeth?
Before presenting a candidate explanation for this fact, a couple of clarifying
remarks are in order. A fixed-gear bicycle has neither a gear-changing
mechanism nor a ‘freewheel’ on the rear axle, so the pedals keep rotating
whenever the back wheel is rotating. While not especially practical, such
bicycles are quite popular, especially with riders who want to perform tricks of
various kinds. Because stopping the pedals stops the back wheel, there is
technically no need for a separate hand-operated brake mechanism. When the
rider stops pedaling, the back wheel stops turning and the bicycle skids to a
halt. This produces wear on the back tire, and if the same part of the tire is
repeatedly used in such skids then this produces what is known as a skid patch.
Here then is the explanation of (8):
(8a) Tires last longer if they have fewer skid patches.
(8b) The number of skid patches is maximized if the number of teeth on
front and rear cogs are coprime.
(8c) Prime numbers are coprime with the fewest other numbers.
(8d) Cyclists prefer to maximize the life of their tires.
(8e) Hence, rear cogs are typically chosen to have a prime number of teeth.
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The parallel with the cicada explanation is clear. In particular, the key
mathematical component relates primeness to minimizing the frequency of
intersection between two periodical phenomena (in this case the rotation of the
front and rear cogs). The property of primeness is again salient, and it can be
used to explain more specific facts about fixed-gear bicycles. For example, why
does the rear cog (p.233) of this particular brakeless, fixed-gear bicycle have
seventeen teeth? A candidate explanation might run as follows:
(8f) Front cogs with between forty and fifty teeth and a gear ratio between
2.3 and three are preferred by most cyclists.
(8g) Hence, the rear cog should have between fourteen and eighteen teeth.
(8h) Hence, this rear cog has seventeen teeth.
Here (8f) is an empirical fact about cyclists’ preferences, and (8g) follows from
(8f) using basic arithmetic.
To summarize, when a mathematical property is salient in a given mini-project
then it will tend to exhibit explanatory power in both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’
directions. In the vertical direction, it will explain other, more specific properties
that hold in the context of the given mini-project. In the horizontal direction, it
will tend to feature in parallel patterns of argument that apply to quite different
mini-projects.

12.6 Avoiding Ontological Inflation
I have argued that it is important for the defender of the Explanatory
Indispensability Argument in the philosophy of mathematics to have some
account of what makes an explanatory mini-project intrinsically indispensable.
Otherwise the anti-Platonist opponent can accept the instrumental
indispensability of mathematics to the overall project of science, and just avoid
those mini-projects in which mathematics is playing a specifically explanatory
role. I have also argued that salience is the key marker for when an explanatory
mini-project that involves a mathematical property is intrinsically indispensable.
But there is also a second reason why it is important to distinguish the
indispensable mini-projects from the dispensable ones, and this is to avoid overgenerating mathematical ontological commitments.
We have actually already witnessed an example of such mathematical inflation,
in mini-project (7). The best explanation of why C. Elegans has a prime number
of cells makes reference to the (ineliminable) property of primeness. But the
salient property here is having 1031 cells, and this can be eliminated using the
language of first-order logic with identity. So including the non-salient property
here would increase our mathematical commitments. In this instance it does not
seem especially serious, of course, because primeness comes in as a salient
property in other mini-projects, such as the cicada mini-project, (6), and the
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skid-patch mini-project, (8). So our global mathematical commitments are not
inflated. However this may not always be the case. For a more dramatic case of
(p.234) potential mathematical inflation, consider the following explanatory
mini-project:
(9) Why do North American cicada species have periods that correspond to
the numerators of coefficients in the series expansion of sinhx/sinx?
Here, sinhx is the hyperbolic sine function, which can be thought of as the
imaginary part of the ordinary trigonometric sine function when this is extended
into the complex plane. A series expansion is a method for calculating a function
that cannot be expressed just by elementary operators (addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and division). The resulting series has an infinite number of
terms, and the more terms that are included in a given calculation the more
accurate the approximation to the original function. Further mathematical
details are not relevant here, except to note that the numerators for the
coefficients of the first three terms of the series for sinhx/sinx are 1, 13, and
17.12
The scenario here is similar to the C. Elegans mini-project, (7). As in that case,
the link between the mathematical property and the physical phenomenon is
(presumably) completely coincidental. If so, then the best explanation of (9) has
the following form:
(9a) Cicadas species are either annual or they are periodical.
(9b) North American periodical cicadas have periods 13 and 17.
[Explanation imported from mini-project (6).]
(9f) Hence, North American cicadas have periods 1, 13, and 17.
(9g) The initial numerators for the series expansion for sinhx/sinx are 1, 13,
and 17.
(9h) Hence, cicada species have periods that correspond to the numerators
of coefficients in the series expansion of sinhx/sinx.
The mathematical property of being a numerator of the given series expansion is
not salient in (9). Why not? Because there is another mathematical property,
having period 1, 13, or 17, which explains the holding of the series numerator
property but is not explained by this latter property.
What is different about mini-project (9) is that the mathematical stakes are
higher. Taking (9) to be a genuine target of explanation forces the introduction
of hyperbolic functions. This expands the domain of mathematical ontology at
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least from the natural numbers to the real numbers, since the function sinhx is
given by (p.235)

and perhaps to the imaginary numbers also, since complex analysis provides the
most natural setting for hyperbolic functions such as sinh.

12.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have focused on Enoch’s proposed indispensability-based
criterion for ontological commitment,
(IP) We ought rationally to be ontologically committed to F’s if F’s are
instrumentally indispensable for an intrinsically indispensable project.
I have focused in particular on his notion of ‘project’ and what it might be for
such projects to be ‘intrinsically indispensable’. My main contention has been
that the issue plays out very differently in the context of the two major domains
that Enoch considers, namely applied mathematics and metaethics. Central to
this difference is that metanormative truths permeate the deliberative project in
a way that mathematical truths do not permeate the explanatory subproject of
science. Once this is coupled with the general abandonment of strong holism
assumptions in the philosophy of science, this shifts the debate to focus on
individual ‘mini-projects’ rather than the global project that Enoch considers.
For such mini-projects, a different notion of rational non-optionality is needed to
ground their intrinsic indispensability. I argue that the notion of a salient
mathematical property can do this job in the context of mini-projects that seek to
explain why some physical phenomenon has a given mathematical property.
Whether some corresponding notion of a salient metanormative property can do
useful work in grounding a metaethical indispensability argument is a question
that I leave to be addressed on another occasion.
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Notes:

(1) In what follows, I will mostly revert to the original formulations, (1) and (4),
and not worry about paraphrasing the X-relatum along the lines of (1’) and (4’).
(2) In this connection, it is interesting to note that in specifying the project
associated with mathematical indispensability arguments, Enoch sometimes
describes it in activity terms (as ‘the explanatory project’) and sometimes in
subject-matter terms (as ‘the scientific project’).
(3) See e.g. Baker (2005, 2009).
(4) A definitive defense of this claim is hampered by the fact that Enoch does not
say much more about what it is to be ‘rationally non-optional’ (as Enoch himself
acknowledges in a humorous footnote (2011 p. 71, n. 51)).
(5) Compare Hume-style assertions about the psychological inevitability of
inductive reasoning. Even if this is true in general, we do seem capable of
resisting specific cases of inductive inference.
(6) Compare also Enoch’s remark: ‘[I]t’s not clear that this line of thought can be
applied to deliberation as a whole (rather than to some particular tokens of
deliberation).’ (2011 p. 77)
(7) For example, if the explanandum is that completing an Euler tour of some
very complicated network is impossible. Perhaps it is possible after all!
(8) For example, if the explanandum is that the Mona Lisa is considered to be
such a valuable work of art.
(9) For discussion of this issue in connection with mathematical explanation in
science, see Baker (2012).
(10) Enoch discusses this issue (2011 pp. 61–3), and argues that having a low
chance of success is good grounds for taking a given project to be optional.
(11) Another, even simpler, example: why do human beings have a prime number
of legs?
(12) This series appears as sequence A069853 in the Sloane Online Encyclopedia
of Integer Sequences.
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